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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
BARTON KAY KIRKHAM, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8684 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
No one says that Barton Kay Kirkham did not kill 
David Avon Frame. 
We are here concerned with but two propositions which 
have been advanced by counsel for defendant on this appeal: 
First: Did the Court below by the giving of Instruc-
tion No. 9 exclude the element of moral wrong 
from the jury's consideration; and, if so, was 
the giving of the instruction erroneous? 
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Second: Was error permitted by the Court below in 
refusing to give to the jury defendant's re-
quested Instruction No. 3; and, as a result 
thereof, was the defendant prejudiced by the 
remarks of counsel for the State during argu-
ment? 
The facts presented in respondent's brief will be limited to 
these issues ; we, of course, understand that on appeal in-
volving murder it is the policy of this Court to review and 
to consider the entire record for error whether cited or not. 
We are confident that if there were possible further con-
tentions for error eminent counsel for appellant would have 
claimed for it. We point to none. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are not in dispute. 
The Court instructed the jury, in part, as follows: 
"INSTRUCTION 9 
"The defendant, in his defense, has pleaded and 
contends that he is not guilty of any crime charged 
in the Information, because, at the time the act was 
committed, he, the defendant, was insane. 
"Insanity may be a complete defense to a crim-
inal act, or it may reduce the degree of offenses, or 
it may have no bearing upon the question of guilt. 
"Insanity is an element in determining ques-
tions of guilt of or punishment for crime only when 
it renders the person so affected irresponsible or 
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partly irresponsible. That is, the defendant cannot 
be convicted of a crime, if, at the time of the act, 
he was insane to such an extent that he did not know 
the nature of the act; that is, did not know he had 
a revolver, that it may be loaded, or that, if dis-
charged, it might injure or kill; OR that, when he 
fired the shot, he did not know it was wrong in the 
sense that such act was condemned by morals or 
law; OR that he was unable, by reason of mental 
disease, to control his actions or impulses to injure 
or kill David Avon Frame. 
"If defendant was afflicted with a disease of the 
mind, at the time of the alleged offense in any one 
or more of these three manners, then, in such case, 
he was not legally responsible and is entitled to an 
acquittal" (Tr. 252). 
It is contended that your appellant was incapable of under-
standing the moral implications of his conduct and that 
the instruction, supra, precluded the jury from considering 
the evidence presented in support thereof. But that under 
the instruction given the jurors were required to find only 
that appellant was of sufficient mentality to know that his 
act was against the law; that the "morality requirement" 
in application of the right and wrong test was denied recog-
nition. 
The Court refused to give appellant's requested In-
struction No. 3, as follows: 
"INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
"The State of Utah has a mental hospital where 
patients who are suffering from mental illness may 
be incarcerated and treated for such time as is con-
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4 
sidered by a court of competent jurisdiction to be 
necessary" ( Tr. 266) . 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 9 WAS NOT 
PREJUDICIAL TO DEFENDANT'S CAUSE. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUC-
TION NO.3. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 9 WAS NOT 
PREJUDICIAL TO DEFENDANT'S CAUSE. 
"INSTRUCTION 9 
"The defendant, in his defense, has pleaded and 
contends that he is not guilty of any crime charged 
in the Information, because, at the time the act was 
committed, he, the defendant, was insane. 
"Insanity may be a complete defense to a crim-
inal act, or it may reduce the degree of offenses, or 
it may have no bearing upon the question of guilt. 
"Insanity is an element in determining ques-
tions of guilt of or punishment for crime only when 
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it renders the person so affected irresponsible or 
partly irresponsible. That is, the defendant cannot 
be convicted of a crime, if, at the time of the act, 
he was insane to such an extent that he did not know 
the nature of the act; that is, did not know he had 
a revolver, that it may be loaded, or that, if dis-
charged, it might injure or kill; OR that, when he 
fired the shot, he did not know it was wrong in the 
sense that such act was condemned by morals or 
law; OR that he was unable, by reason of mental 
disease, to control his actions or impulses to injure 
or kill David Avon Frame. 
"If defendant was afflicted with a disease of 
the mind, at the time of the alleged offense in any 
one or more of these three manners, then, in such 
case, he was not legally responsible and is entitled to 
an acquittal" (Tr. 252). 
The adverse criticism made of the instruction is that 
the use of the disjunctive "or" instead of "and" between 
the words "morals" and "law" instructs the jury that if 
Kirkham knew that his acts were against the law he was 
legally sane. There has long been a question as to whether, 
under the M'Naghten test, "right and wrong" means legally 
or morally, right or wrong; it has been written on this 
subject: 
"* * * The judges in M'Naghten's Case ap-
parently took the view that the knowledge of right 
and wrong involved in that test was a knowledge as 
to whether the act committed was wrong by the law 
of the land, stating, in answer to the first question 
as to the effect of an insane delusion, that the act 
would be punishable according to the nature of the 
crime committed, although committed in consequence 
of such a delusion, if the accused knew at the time 
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of committing the crime that he was acting contrary 
to the law of the land. 
"And the argument that under the rule the term 
"right and wrong, should be taken in the moral 
rather than in the legal sense was rejected in Reg. 
v. Windle [1952] 2 QB 826, [1952] 2 All Eng. 1, the 
court saying that the law could only distinguish be-
tween that which was in accordance with law and 
that which was contrary thereto. 
"In United States v. Smith (1954) 5 USCMA 
314, 17 CMR 314, it was said that an accused's no-
tion that an act was morally right, although he rea-
lized its legal wrongfulness, would not constitute 
a defense under the 'right-and-wrong' test as applied 
in the military establishment. 
"Knowledge that the act committed was a viola-
tion of the criminal law was held in McElroy v. State 
(1922) 146 Tenn. 442, 242 SW 883, to be sufficient 
to justify holding the accused responsible. The court 
held that the accused's delusion that the killing in 
question had been directed by God was not sufficient 
to excuse him in view of the showing that he knew 
it was against the law, saying that it was no new 
thing for criminals to attempt to justify their con-
duct upon the excuse that they had acted on a divine 
command, but that men cannot put themselves be-
yond the reach of the law by the indulgence of such 
vain imaginations. 
"And in Ha.rrison. v. Sta.te (1902) 44 Tex. Crim. 
164, 69 SvV 500, one who committed bigamy under 
the delusion that the act had been directed by a 
vision from God was held to be responsible, where 
he admittedly knew, at the time, that his act was 
punishable by the law of the state. 
"However, the case of Bergin v. Stack [1952] 
Austr. LT 810, as stated in the Eng. & Emp. Dig., 
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3d Cum. Supp. 1955, holds that in certain criminal 
cases the test of insanity is whether the accused 
knew that his act was wrong according to the stan-
dards of reasonable men, not whether he knew it 
was wrong as being contrary to law. 
"And in People v. Schmidt (1915) 216 NY 324, 
110 NE 945, LRA 1916D 519, Ann. Cas. 1916A 978, 
the court took the view that the wrong contemplated 
by the M'Naghten test is moral and not legal wrong." 
[Anno. 45 ALR 2d 1447, 1454.] 
Instruction No. 9 was given as a mimeographed "stock" in-
struction. The wording thereof is as suggested by this 
Court in State v. Green, 78 U. 580, 6 P. 2d 177, 184; (see 
also the recent (1956) case of State v. Riggle, 298 P. 2d 349, 
367) and, of the identical instruction this Court has said: 
"* * * The * * * instruction is a con-
cise and correct statement of law applicable to the 
case in hand. State v. Green * * * " 
[State v. Green, 86 U. 192, 40 P. 2d 961.] 
The rule as laid down by the Court in the M'Naghten 
case has been widely adopted and is, we think, the estab-
lished law of this jurisdiction. State v. Green (both cases), 
supra; 45 ALR 2d at 1452-3. This Court has recognized 
both of the tests laid down by M'N aghteri's case, and has 
held that a person is not criminally responsible where he 
does not know the nature and quality of his act as well as 
not knowing right from wrong. State v. Brown, 36 U. 46, 
102 P. 641; State v. Green, supra. This Court has also rec-
ognized the "irresistible· impulse" modification of the M'-
Naghten rule. State v. Green, supra. Your appellant now 
asks this Honorable Court to further revise the rule by 
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adopting the minority views expressed in People v. Schmidt, 
216 N. Y. 324, 110 N. E. 945, L. R. A. 1916D 519, Ann. Cas. 
1916A 978; i. e., the view that the wrong contemplated by 
the M'Naghten test is moral but not legal wrong. Or, in 
the alternative, we opine, seek to have the Court declare 
that a defendant must [to be criminally responsible] know 
that the act complained of was legally and morally wrong. 
We think the rule best left as it is; that the jury's inquiry 
of the defendant should be, first, was the act committed 
wrong by the law of the land; second, did the defendant 
know the nature and quality of his act so as to be criminally 
responsible therefor, recognizing and applying the "irre-
sistible impulse" test to the latter inquiry. Instruction No. 
9 is clear and concise as to these tests ; if a defendant be 
so insane that he does not know his act to be against law, 
then he cannot be criminally responsible and his moral 
outlook becomes as nothing. Legal insanity is a disorder of 
intellect. Moral insanity is a disorder of the feelings and 
propensities. The first is a defense, the second an excuse, 
a reason for wrongdoing, nothing more. To rationalize 
otherwise would be to sanction such crimes as polygamy as 
'veil as murder and make enforcement of la-\v dependent 
upon individual moral concept. 
May we say, not facetiously, that in giving full weight 
to all of the Court's instructions the jurors took little notice 
of the "or", used in place of the "and" between the words 
"moral" and "law" in Instruction No. 9. The word "or" is 
frequently misused. (Blacks La'v Dictionary. Fourth Edi-
tion.) The jury found your appellant capable of distinguish-
ing between right and wrong with reference to the particu-
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lar act complained of and the rules governing the insanity 
defense in this jurisdiction. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUC-
TION NO.3. 
Your appellant requested of the Court the following 
instruction: 
"INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
"The State of Utah has a mental hospital where 
patients who are suffering from mental illness may 
be incarcerated and treated for such time as. is con-
sidered by a court of competent jurisdiction to be 
necessary.'' 
The requested instruction was not predicated on or ap-
plicable to the issues presented by the pleadings and the 
evidence and therefore it was erroneous and properly re-
fused. State v. Dubois, (Utah) 98 P. 2d 354; State v. 
Marasco, 17 P. 2d 919, 81 Utah 325; State v. Anderson, 100 
Utah 468, 116 P. 2d 968; State v. Thompson, 110 Utah 113, 
170 P. 2d 153; State v. BeBee, 110 Utah 484, 175 P. 2d 478; 
see also 23 C. J. S. Criminal Law, Sec. 1310, page 902, and 
supplement. In State v. Thompson, supra, this Court said: 
"We have repeatedly criticized the giving of 
abstract statements of the law to the jurr, and held 
that it is the duty of the court to apply the law to 
the facts supported by the evidence and to not in-
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struct on any question which is not involved in the 
case under the evidence." 
[Utah authorities there cited.] 
In State v. Riggle, Wyo. 1956, supra, it was held that the 
power of the Board of Pardons was not pertinent to the 
issues and that is was proper not to instruct the jury there-
on. We see an anology. 
Appellant claims for his requested instruction under 
authority of 64-7-36 (Subsection G), U. C. A. 1953, this 
statute is not for application in a criminal cause; where a 
verdict is returned of not guilty by reason of insanity the 
Court proceeds and makes its determination under 77-24-14, 
Code of Criminal Procedure, U. C. A. 1953. Be that as it 
may, your appellant appears to concede that there was no 
admitted evidence pertaining to incarceration . for insanity 
or discharge of the defendant upon return of a verdict of 
not guilty by reason of insanity. Of the District Attorney's 
statement they say : 
"* * * It was not founded on any evidence 
introduced by either party. * * *" 
(Appellant's brief, p. 25.) 
If so the above authorities, cited for the rule that the in-
struction was properly refused for want of applicability to 
the issues presented by the evidence, are controlling. 
Appellant's argument under Point II of his brief con-
c-erns itself more pointedly to the conduct and remarks of 
the District .Attornev than to the contended error of the 
Court in refusing the requested instruction. We are not 
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prepared to say that the contention raised for appellant is 
not without merit ; we find ourselves concerned over the 
propriety of the remarks complained of, however, we here 
claim, upon the record, for no prejudicial error. If, as ap-
pellant contends, it was in fact anticipated by counsel that 
the District Attorney might claim that a verdict of not 
guilty by reason of insanity would result in the defendant 
being "turned loose" it might have been best had they con-
sulted the Court prior to arguments as to their concern. 
An objection to the initial remark concerning the subject 
matter would also have been proper. Factually, however, 
it ·~ould seem that counsel for the defendant "wielded the 
shield into a sword" and therewith struck many telling 
blows for the defense. Appellant complains of the District 
Attorney as follows : 
"The District Attorney did in fact state in his 
opening argument to the jury: 'Should you acquit 
him, he would be turned loose' (R. 204). Again in 
his rebuttle argument Mr. Anderson belabored at 
great length the proposition that defendant would 
be turned loose if found not guilty by reason of in-
sanity" (R. 231, 232). 
(Appellant's brief, p. 25.) 
For what the District Attorney uttered we turn to the 
:record, opening argument: 
"* * * It seems to me that the essence of 
this case is found in what we see in the testimony 
of the doctor, when he said every man who commits 
a killing or a murder-every man is-either does it 
because of neurosis, psychosis-which is a mental 
disease of one sort or another-or psychopathic per-
sonality, which is not insanity-which is a character 
disorder. 
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"And the defendant in this case is not one of 
the first two groups and would not be hospitalized, 
according to the report which the doctor returned. 
Should you acquit him, he would be turned loose. 
* * *" (Tr. 204). 
Closing argument: 
"* * * Counsel has accused me of mislead-
ing you, and I refer now to the instructions, so that 
I may make no mistake and may correct any misim-
pression which they may have left with you. 
"Defense said they don't want to turn this boy 
loose on society, and they have said I have misled 
you ; and nothing is farther from the truth, if, by a 
verdict of not guilty, you are led to believe that he 
may go free. 
"The doctor here who has examined him has 
said that, in his examination which took place after 
this incident-counsel queried him and asked him 
if his examination did not include a consideration of 
the events of this night, and he said it did. The 
doctor went on to say that hospitalization at this 
time is not indicated, and I think that was his re-
sponse in the report to the court. 
"You interpret that--and you have the right; 
you have heard him. What is your conclusion? If 
it isn't hospitalization on a plea--or on a verdict of 
not guilty-what is it? Where \Vould you stand? 
"Then, consider next with regard to this ques-
tion of insanity; counsel says, ''Ve are not asking 
you to turn him loose on society.' That was Mr. 
Duncan, but. then. Mr. Black gets up and he argues 
Instruction No. 10 to you, which says that the defen-
dant-legal insanity is-'the test in determining 
legal insanity is not whether the defendant, at the 
time of committing the offense, knew what he was 
doing. but whether the defendant \¥as in such mental 
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13 
condition as to be able to distinguish between right 
and wrong in reference to the particular act com-
plained of. 
" 'In this connection, you are instructed that the 
State of Utah has the burden of proving to your 
minds beyond all reasonable doubt that defendant 
was sane at the time of killing David Avon Frame, 
and, if the State has failed to sustain this burden, 
you must find defendant not guilty by reason of in-
sanity.' 
"If he was legally insane, as they seem to be 
arguing with you, in support of the plea of 'not 
guilty by reason of insanity,' if Mr. Black wants you 
to believe that this is insanity, as he so positively 
declares the doctor said, aren't they, then, asking 
you for a verdict of not guilty? If they ask you not 
to turn him loose on society, they are asking you for 
a verdict other than not guilty, and, if they are ask-
ing you for a verdict other than not guilty, then they 
don't believe themselves-their argument on legal 
insanity-and, furthermore, the doctor did not say 
that this man was legally insane. He said that there 
are three categories into which a murderer falls, 
and he repeated them-psychosis, neurosis, or psy-
chopathic personality; and the defendant is neither 
or the first two; the defendant is the third ; and, 
with respect to the third, he said every murder in 
cold blood, and murder, except police and military 
in war, is abnormal. 
"The cold-blooded murder is an abnormal act, 
and that every criminal, generally speaking, may 
be classified as either 'moderate' or 'severe' char-
acter disorder. Are we to excuse them all, then, 
because they have character disorder? Is that the 
purport of the defense? He said, even they would 
not turn the defendant free. * * *" 
(Tr. 231, 232, 233.) 
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Counsel for the defense countered the above arguments as 
follows: 
LaMar Duncan, Esq.: 
'' * * * Might I say, right in the beginning, 
that we are not interested in-in any way, in your 
releasing this boy on society. Mr. Black and I, right 
from the beginning, have been very frank; we have 
been very open with His Honor and with you. We 
have not withheld anything, and we haven't tried to 
tell you anything that wasn't so. We have been just 
as fair as we know how in the defense of this young 
boy. 
"Now, where are these sources that come to 
make up this boy's thinking? 
"And, while counsel is talking about 'justice,' 
I want to tell you that he misled you; that that man 
told you something that wasn't true. He told you 
that the doctor here-and the doctor was fair, he 
was called by both sides. He did say-and I submit 
to you the record-ladies and gentlemen of the jury, 
he did say that a character disorder was a mental 
disorder. He wants to categorize in some sort of 
way so he can get over this thing. 
"He is just blood-thirsty; that is all he has got 
in mind. I have practiced law for over twenty-three 
years, and I have never seen a prosecutor that would 
deliberately go out of his way to try to mislead. 
That was a deliberate attempt to mislead you, and 
I think you all got it. I think you heard what that 
doctor said ; that doctor went into great detail, and 
this is what he said : 
"He said a person with this kind of mind, he 
would feel in his own way that he was justified in 
what he did. He said he would have a build-up in-
side of him-a tension-that was built up, and, as 
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a result of that tension, he just reacted in a certain 
fashion, and that was all there was to it. 
"Now, this is a terrible thing. I am not trying 
to minimize the thing that happened, nor am I try-
ing to tell you that it is a small matter. It is a mat-
ter of deep concern, and I have said-and I repeat 
right at the outset-that we are not asking you, in 
any manner, to release this boy on society. That 
has never been our intention. * * * 
(Tr. 209, 210, 211.) 
"* * * Now, we have raised this question of 
insanity, not for any purpose of releasing this boy 
on society-a 19-year-old boy. 
"Counsel comes in and he yells for blood. He 
wants you, ladies and gentlemen, to forget all Chris-
tian principles that you have. He wants you to 
revert to the old savage Mosiac law in this case, of 
an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. He wants 
to have the life of this boy. * * * 
(Tr. 213.) 
"* * * 
"I am reading Instruction No. 17 : 
" 'If you find the defendant guilty of murder 
in the first degree, it will then be your duty to de-
termine whether you will recommend that he be 
imprisoned for life at hard labor. If you do not 
make this recommendation, the court, under the law, 
has no alternative but to impose a sentence of death. 
If you do make this recommendation, the court is 
given the discretion of sentencing defendant either 
to life imprisonment at hard labor or death.' 
"In other words, his Honor himself would take 
upon himself that responsibility. 
" 'The making or withholding of the foregoing 
recommendation is a matter entirely within your 
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discretion to be exercised in any manner and for 
any reason you see fit, and you must not take any-
thing that may or may not have been said or done 
by this court as any intimation of the court as to 
what should or should not control or influence you 
in reaching a conclusion on this matter.' 
"Now, we are confronted with, what are we 
going to do? I have said, and repeat, that we, in no 
way, want you, or desire that you, should turn this 
boy loose on society; * * * 
"He has said-his Honor has told you in this 
instruction that you can make than recommendation. 
* * * 
(Tr. 214, 215.) 
"* * * 
"It isn't much I am asking for. We are not 
asking-! repeat again-asking you to turn this boy 
loose, but I am asking you to give her just a ray of 
hope-that which the Master gave all of us-that 
she might, on Christmas morning, have a hope of 
life. It may be life behind four walls and for the rest 
of his life; and that in itself-that is your preroga-
tive ; but, again, I plead with you to give this boy 
-to spare his life--if not for his sake, for the sake 
of this boy's mother, who has already been through 
a thousand hells as she sat here. * * *" 
(Tr. 217.) 
Wayne L. Black, Esq.: 
"* * * 
"Counsel makes another remark that I want to 
refer to: 'If you acquit him, he will be turned loose.' 
That is as far from the fact as anything that could 
possibly be said in this court here today. Counsel 
knows, and you know, that determination of insan-
ity-determinations of whether a person should be 
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incarcerated in mental institutions-. are matters for 
the court, to be determined according to the court's 
dictates and the court's decisions. 
"I say to you, there isn't anything this jury can 
do today that would turn this boy loose on society. 
There is no verdict you could render that would turn 
him loose on society. Your decision is going to de-
termine one of three things : Either he is going to 
go into a mental institution-and Dr. Nelson said 
that this would require in-patient treatment over 
a long period of years; didn't you hear him say that? 
"Either he is going into a mental institution, 
or he is going out to the State Prison for the rest of 
his life, or he is going to stand before a firing squad 
for the commission of this offense. 
"Those are the three, and only three, alterna-
tives that stand in the way of this boy's life at this 
cross-roads of his life. Now, I want that to be in-
delibly and crystally-clear before the court and jury. 
He is not going to be turned free on society, regard-
less of what anyone does. 
"* * * 
"Now, it is the law that, if you should return 
a verdict of first degree murder-and I say God 
forbid that you do-if you should return a verdict 
of first degree murder in this case, you have the 
further responsibility of determining whether or not 
to recommend leniency. If you do not recommend 
leniency, the court has no choice, no discretion but 
to sentence this boy to go out some cold, early morn-
ing, and to face a firing squad, or to face a hang-
man's noose. If you do recommend leniency, then, 
of course, the responsibility is with the court to 
further deliberate and determine whether his pun-
ishment shall be life imprisonment or shall be death 
at the hands of an executioner. * * *" 
(Tr. 225, 226, 227.) 
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So far as the pleadings and the evidence in this matter are 
concerned, both counsel for prosecution and defense were 
probably "out of bounds." From the entire proceedings and 
remarks made it is evident that the jury could not have 
possibly been misled and the defendant's cause was not 
prejudiced. 
We contend that the evidence of defendant's guilt and 
sanity was so clear and convincing that no reasonable jury 
could be expected to return a different verdict, even in the 
absence of the irregularities, and the error complained of, 
if any, was harmless. State v. St. Clair, 3 Utah 2d 230, 244, 
282 P. 2d 323, 332. If this is not a case where capital pun-
ishment should be imposed, then such punishment might 
well be eliminated from our statute books. 
CONCLUSION 
The verdict should be permitted to stand. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Deputy Attorney General, 
Atto1~~eys for Respondent. 
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